Colombia: Massive March Against New President Calls for National Strike

October 16, 2026

Since taking office in August, President Abelardo de la Espriella has faced steady resistance, both in public debate and in Congress. On Wednesday, October 14, that resistance moved to the streets.

Teachers’ unions, labor federations, students, Indigenous organizations and opposition parties called the marches, and people took to the streets in cities across Colombia. Many other Colombians who fear where the new government is headed joined them. Their reasons varied. Some came to defend the labor and pension reforms and the minimum wage gains won under former president Gustavo Petro. Others rejected the new security agenda or demanded answers on the recovery from August’s earthquake, where aid has been slow and uneven and questions remain about how relief funds are being managed. For the organizers, the day was only a first step toward a national strike in November, with a date still to be set.

The president set the tone before anyone marched. In a televised address on Monday, he accused the organizers of trying to destabilize his government. He also announced a decree regulating protest and an anti-terrorism bill he plans to send to Congress.

He signed the decree Tuesday night, hours before the first marches. In some cases, it allows police to act against people they consider violent without first exhausting dialogue. The Defensoría del Pueblo, Colombia’s ombudsman, warned that the decree could label nonviolent acts as violent and turn mediation into a formality. It also reminded the government that a call to protest is not a matter of public order or terrorism. Opposition lawmakers have already challenged the decree in court, arguing that only Congress can regulate the right to protest.

The marches were overwhelmingly peaceful. By the government’s own count, 98 percent of them saw no incidents. Tension came late in the day, when riot police intervened at six points in four cities. The government reports six arrests, a figure that has not been independently confirmed.

Colombia’s Constitution protects the right to protest, and the state has a duty to guarantee it, no matter who governs or who takes to the streets. Global Exchange calls on Colombian authorities to respect the rights of everyone detained and to investigate any reports of arbitrary detention promptly and transparently. We condemn any excessive or unlawful use of force against demonstrators, journalists or bystanders. We join the ombudsman in insisting that force remain a last resort, and we urge the government to suspend the decree while the courts review it.

The president dismissed the marchers as “a small minority that wants to bring Colombia to a halt.” Much of the traditional media echoed that framing, repeating government statements and, early in the day, circulating photos of empty streets that suggested the mobilization had failed. That narrative ignores a basic fact: the president won by less than one percentage point, and nearly half of voters chose someone else. Those Colombians did not disappear after the election. On Wednesday, many of them were in the streets, and in November they plan to return. How the government responds will show what kind of democracy Colombia is becoming.

September 9, 2026

Yesterday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in Barranquilla, Colombia, to meet with President Abelardo De la Espriella. The visit was part of a three-country regional tour, and it was the clearest sign yet of how fast, and how completely, Colombia’s new government has aligned itself with Washington. The two governments signed what they are calling the “Barranquilla Accords,” two memoranda of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation and on critical minerals and rare earths, part of a broader U.S. push to secure supply chains outside China, which currently dominates rare-earth production and refining.  

What is happening in Colombia right now looks less like the normal give-and-take between allied governments and more like a playbook, one increasingly familiar across Latin America, associated with Donald Trump. Trump endorsed De la Espriella during the campaign, explicitly comparing De la Espriella’s movement to his own MAGA. De la Espriella wrote back, crediting Trump with paving the way against the region’s “entrenched powers” and adding that in Colombia, “we have now begun to follow the same path.”   

De la Espriella’s government began in turbulence. Three days after his August 7 inauguration, a magnitude-7.4 earthquake struck western Colombia, killing more than 330 people and displacing hundreds of thousands. The government estimates reconstruction will cost at least $30 billion and has secured less than half so far. Even so, De la Espriella moved quickly on his campaign promises alongside the disaster response, a choice that says something on its own: he found the bandwidth for ideological moves in the middle of a national emergency. 

Domestically, the pattern begins with controlling the message and deliberately confronting institutions that can challenge the government. A leaked directive sought to limit ministers’ interviews to “friendly” outlets. Two days later, a presidential directive centralized official communications under the presidency and required ministers to obtain authorization before speaking to the press, the same press-management instinct that has defined Trump’s own White House. 

At the same time, De la Espriella has moved to cast his predecessor as the source of the country’s problems and insecurity. Through a series of executive resolutions, he formally closed the “Paz Total” tables Petro’s government had kept open, revoking negotiators’ status and reclassifying those armed groups as military targets. He warned governors and mayors that none of them may hold their own contacts or negotiations with these groups, closing off any local alternative to his approach. Throughout, he has portrayed the previous administration as complicit in the violence it failed to stop, the standard opening move of a leader positioning himself as the rescuer of a country his predecessor supposedly ruined. 

The same instinct extends to what his government itself calls a “cultural battle,” in which religion sits at the center of public life. “In this hand I will carry a Bible, and in this one a rifle to fight crime,” De la Espriella said during the campaign. His Ministry of Education has already proposed allowing churches to run public schools, promising to take “Marx out of education and put God in.” Teachers’ groups rejected the proposal, and legal scholars have questioned its compatibility with Colombia’s constitutional protections for a secular state.

Abroad, the same playbook is producing an equally sharp shift. On August 10, amid the earthquake response, Colombia recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, Syrian territory occupied since 1967. Only one other government has taken that position: Trump’s first administration, in 2019. Not Milei, not Bukele, not Noboa. De la Espriella went further than his regional counterparts. Netanyahu thanked him; roughly twenty countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, condemned the move. He has also pledged to move Colombia’s embassy to Jerusalem, echoing Trump’s 2018 decision. 

Colombia is also moving deeper into Washington’s security architecture. It joined the U.S.-led “Shield of the Americas,” and days later, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced that De la Espriella had authorized “joint military operations” with U.S. forces. Unconfirmed reports also suggest Colombia is now considering withdrawal from the International Criminal Court, which would end two decades of membership. The reports follow a Washington-led campaign urging Latin American governments to abandon the Rome Statute and come weeks after Venezuela withdrew, consistent with De la Espriella’s pledge to reconsider Colombia’s relationship with the UN, the OAS, and the Inter-American human rights system.

The clearest picture of this presidency, though, may come from a single video. Last month, footage circulated of De la Espriella walking slowly past twenty-three body bags after a military strike, triumphant music playing as he narrated the operation for the cameras. Spanish media compared the staging to the security-branding style of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, whose mega-prison model De la Espriella has praised. Colombia’s Human Rights Ombudsman responded directly: “We should not normalize dead bodies becoming part of the backdrop for a public statement, nor death becoming a way to display authority.”  

Colombia has lived through more than 50 years of internal armed conflict. A government there should not need reminding, one month into office, that human dignity does not disappear with death, or that even war has limits. This display offers an early sign of how De la Espriella intends to exercise power. 

How close Colombia moves toward Washington matters less than what it costs the country to get there: its democracy, its institutions, its foreign policy. But that traffic runs both ways. Whatever room exists for resistance to this playbook in Washington sets the parameters of what is possible everywhere else it shows up, Colombia included. 

Last August I spent a week in the United States, participating in the Democracy Defenders Roadshow, swapping notes with community college students packed into a lecture hall across Northern New Jersey, standing before a large, reflective crowd at the Ethical Society in New York City, and sharing a long table at a community dinner in Philadelphia, plates going around while the conversation did too. What stuck with me was not really about Colombia. It was the realization that people up there in the United States do not fully grasp how closely, and how anxiously, the rest of the world is watching them, not just what happens, but whether the United States resists this playbook and the authoritarian tide behind it. What is unfolding in Barranquilla matters, but so does what happens up there. That is the part I tried to leave people with in New Jersey, in New York, in Philadelphia: what is unfolding in Barranquilla is not just Colombia’s problem to solve.

Written by: Karen Dayana Mosquera Palacios

August 20, 2026

Global Exchange stands with the people of Colombia following the earthquake that struck on August 10. I write not only on behalf of Global Exchange, but as a Colombian whose own family and community were among those hit — Cali, Chocó, Buenaventura are not names I know from headlines; they are home. 

On the morning of August 10, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake struck western Colombia — the country’s strongest in nearly five decades. So far: 312 dead, 4,380 injured, and 290 still missing. The government has registered 143.533 families — 294.503 people — as affected across 470 municipalities. More than 29.680 homes have been destroyed outright, another 134.282 are damaged badly enough that families can’t safely go back inside, and 227 buildings have collapsed. Put simply: tens of thousands of Colombians do not have anywhere of their own to sleep tonight.  

The quake struck a government three days into office, its transition still unfinished — without the reliable information and coordinated response capacity a functioning transition would have provided.

The earthquake was felt across a broad swath of the country, including Cali, Pereira, Quibdó, Buenaventura, Manizales, and dozens of smaller communities now confronting loss and extensive damage. The impact has been especially severe in the Pacific — in places like the department of Chocó and the port city of Buenaventura, predominantly Black and Indigenous territories that were already among Colombia’s poorest before the ground shook, historically forgotten and underserved because of structural racism and decades of insufficient public investment.

That neglect did not start with the earthquake — it exposed it. Roads were blocked, phone lines went dark, and communities that have long faced barriers to healthcare, infrastructure, transportation, and basic government services were suddenly confronting a disaster on top of them. The need is enormous, and the road to recovery will be long.

This is exactly why we cannot let attention move on once the news cycle does.

Global Exchange will stay engaged with our partners across Colombian civil society, amplifying the voices of affected communities and pushing for the resources, support, and accountability they deserve. But Colombia cannot do this alone — at a moment like this, solidarity from beyond its borders matters, so that the hardest-hit communities aren’t left to rebuild by themselves.

This is not only about getting communities through the next few weeks; it is about making sure they have what they need to rebuild safely, recover with dignity, and not be forgotten again once the headlines fade.

Right now, the priority is getting clean drinking water, nutritious food, and shelter to people while the longer work of rebuilding takes shape. Global Exchange has already sent $20,000 to trusted partners on the ground, who are running collective kitchens and distributing food and basic necessities to the communities hit hardest. If you’re able to, please consider supporting Global Exchange’s work in Colombia — every contribution helps us keep responding as needs continue to evolve in the weeks ahead. If you’re not able to give, sharing this with your friends, family, and networks is its own way of helping. 

Solidarity is not born from abundance, but from empathy.

June 25, 2026

Three days after Colombians went to the polls, Iván Cepeda acknowledged Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory in the presidential election.

Electoral authorities have not yet formally certified the final result, a process expected to conclude later this week. Yet politically, the dispute has effectively come to an end. After days of challenges, reviews, and scrutiny of the vote count, the candidate of the governing coalition accepted the outcome yesterday and announced that his movement will continue its work from the opposition.

In his concession, Cepeda reiterated concerns about foreign interference, vote-buying, and the use of artificial intelligence to spread disinformation during the campaign. He also pledged to continue organizing across the country and defending the political project that mobilized millions of Colombians. “We will not leave the Colombian people alone,” he said, adding that he would not let Colombia become “a protectorate of the United States.”

The election is over. A new reality begins now.

For months, Colombians were told they were living through a national crisis. De la Espriella built his campaign around that premise, arguing that four years of Gustavo Petro had left the country on the wrong path. He promised to restore order through a hardline security agenda, end Petro’s Paz Total policy of negotiating with armed groups, and repeatedly portrayed Iván Cepeda as an ally of the FARC, the ELN, and other criminal organizations. His message was straightforward: Colombia needed to be rescued.  The country his administration is about to inherit is more complex than that narrative suggests.

Colombia enters this transition with inflation under control, poverty below its recent peak, exchange-rate stability, and continued economic growth. None of this means the country’s challenges have disappeared. Violence remains a serious concern in many regions. Inequality persists. Public trust in institutions remains fragile. Millions of Colombians continue to struggle to make ends meet. 

The next administration will not be governing a country in collapse. It will be governing one with functioning institutions and significant unresolved problems. Delivering meaningful improvements under those conditions may prove more difficult than winning an election.

Campaigns operate in the world of promises. Governments operate in the world of constraints. Many of De la Espriella’s most ambitious proposals, from his security agenda to broader institutional reforms, will require legislative approval, cooperation from other branches of government, budgetary resources, and, above all, political consensus. He will take office facing a fragmented Congress, active social movements, independent courts, and a country where nearly half of voters chose a different path. Governing, therefore, will require more than winning. It will require negotiating and building legitimacy among people who did not vote for him. 

One of the first tests of that challenge may come in Colombia’s relationship with Washington.

De la Espriella is a dual U.S.-Colombian citizen and a registered Republican who lived for years in Miami before becoming a U.S. citizen in 2023, a naturalization process that required him to swear an oath of allegiance to the United States. Before entering politics, he built one of Colombia’s most prominent law firms, known for representing some of the country’s most controversial clients, including Alex Saab, a businessman linked to the Maduro government who was extradited to the United States, and David Murcia Guzmán, who was convicted in the largest pyramid scheme in Colombian history. 

His ties to Washington are already being tested before he has even taken office. Ohio Senator Bernie Moreno recently said he met with De la Espriella and discussed illegal migration. According to Moreno, De la Espriella “immediately agreed that ANY Colombian citizen claiming asylum should return to Colombia,” a position Moreno framed as part of a broader U.S. policy that treats immigration as “a privilege, not a right.”

It is an early signal of how closely Bogotá’s foreign and migration policies may come to mirror Washington’s, and how much room there will be for a Colombian government to disagree with the country its president once swore allegiance to and with which he maintains deep personal ties.  

Those questions extend beyond foreign policy. For many Colombians who did not vote for De la Espriella, the election result represents more than a political defeat. During the campaign, he embraced “iron fist” rhetoric, at one point saying he would “gut” the Colombian left and warning that he would not tolerate protests he considered disruptive to public order. Press freedom organizations have also documented a pattern of lawsuits and legal actions against journalists who have reported critically on him.  

Combined with his close political alignment with the Trump administration and his past representation of controversial clients, these factors have fueled concerns among many Colombians about the future of political dissent, press freedom, the rights of vulnerable communities, and the country’s sovereignty. Those concerns are not limited to a fringe. They reflect the anxieties of millions of Colombians who supported a different vision for the country.

For Cepeda and his supporters, the election carries a different lesson.

Despite defeat, more than twelve million Colombians backed a progressive project, and that constituency did not disappear when the election ended. It remains a standing force in Colombian politics, one that Colombian society can continue to count on to carry forward the fight for labor rights, peace implementation, environmental protection, and social justice, the causes that nearly half of those who voted chose to support. The challenge for Cepeda’s coalition now is to keep that movement organized, engaged, and effective from the opposition, not just at the ballot box every four years.

The months ahead will reveal whether the incoming administration can translate campaign slogans into effective governance, whether it can lower tensions rather than deepen them, and whether it can meet expectations that are often easier to raise than to satisfy.

Global Exchange’s work does not end with an election. We will continue standing alongside our partners in Colombian civil society, defending democratic space, amplifying the voices of communities most affected by political decisions, and monitoring the challenges that lie ahead.

June 22, 2026

Yesterday, Colombians went to the polls to choose their next president.

Today, headlines around the world are reporting that far-right candidate and Trump ally Abelardo de la Espriella has won. Based on the preliminary vote count and reliable sources, that appears to be the case. De la Espriella leads government candidate Iván Cepeda by less than one percentage point, one of the narrowest presidential margins in Colombia’s recent history. 

Yet there is an important distinction that many observers outside Colombia may not fully grasp: the election is not yet formally concluded.

What Colombians saw on election night was the preconteo, a rapid preliminary count designed to provide an early snapshot of the results. While it is typically a reliable indicator of the outcome, it carries no legal weight. The legally binding stage comes next: the escrutinio, Colombia’s official vote verification process. Conducted by electoral authorities, judges, and notaries, it involves reviewing tally sheets, resolving challenges and claims submitted by campaigns, and verifying the results before they can be formally certified.

For most elections, the distinction receives little attention because the margin is large enough that the final outcome is rarely in doubt. This time is different.

The margin separating the two candidates is less than one percentage point, roughly 250,000 votes. Iván Cepeda has announced challenges affecting thousands of polling stations and says his campaign will await the completion of the official review process before formally recognizing the result. The election now moves from election-night projections to the institutional mechanisms designed to provide legal certainty and public confidence. 

Yet while that process is only beginning, political reactions have moved much faster.

Within hours of the preliminary count, President Donald Trump congratulated De la Espriella, while several conservative leaders across the hemisphere and beyond, including Javier Milei, Daniel Noboa, José Antonio Kast, Nasry Asfura, José Raúl Mulino, Giorgia Meloni, and Benjamin Netanyahu, celebrated the result as a victory for their broader political movement. Some of these figures had openly intervened in Colombia’s election during recent weeks; others are only now weighing in, treating the election as settled. 

Whether the preliminary result ultimately becomes the certified result is precisely what the official count process is designed to determine.

But the speed of those celebrations highlights a deeper issue. Democratic legitimacy depends not only on votes being cast but also on institutions being allowed to complete their work. Respect for sovereignty means respecting the entire electoral process, not only the part that produces a favorable headline. 

The international reaction also reveals a larger objective and scope. For many of the foreign leaders who openly backed de la Espriella, this election was never only about Colombia. It was viewed as part of a broader regional struggle over the political direction of Latin America. In that sense, the preliminary result is already being interpreted as a victory for what President Trump has rebranded as the “Donroe Doctrine” and for a foreign policy seeking to reshape the hemisphere in Washington’s image.

That interpretation did not wait for the official count. Within hours of the preliminary result, Republican Representative María Elvira Salazar declared that attention now turns to Brazil, where voters will choose their next president in October. For many of those celebrating abroad, Colombia is not the end of the story. It is the latest chapter in a broader regional political project.

What is also clear is that Colombia remains deeply polarized.

Nearly half of voters supported one vision for the country; nearly half supported another. The campaign exposed profound dissent over security, economic policy, peace, democracy, environmental protection, and Colombia’s place in the world. It also revealed something else: neither side is large enough to govern as if the other does not exist.

If the preliminary results are confirmed, Abelardo de la Espriella will inherit a country that cannot be governed through triumphalism, confrontation, or force alone. He would take office facing strong opposition, powerful social movements, and entire regions where political trust remains fragile. The challenge ahead will not simply be winning power but exercising it in a way that lowers tensions rather than deepens them.

For Iván Cepeda and his supporters, the result would also carry lessons. The campaign significantly narrowed what many analysts once viewed as a wider gap, mobilizing millions of voters and demonstrating that support for progressive politics remains substantial. Whatever the final outcome, nearly half the country has made clear that it expects its voice to be heard.

The coming days will be critical. The scrutiny of electoral authorities, the behavior of political leaders, and the resilience of democratic institutions will matter just as much as the votes already cast. 

Global Exchange’s work does not end with an election. We will continue standing alongside our partners in Colombian civil society, monitoring the transition process, defending democratic space, and amplifying the voices of communities most affected by the decisions of those in power.

Sovereignty, democracy, and human rights are not settled on a single election night. They are defended every day that follows.

June 20, 2026

Tomorrow, Colombians return to the polls to choose their next president. 

On paper, it is a domestic runoff between two candidates with opposite visions for the country. In practice, it has become something larger: a test of whether Colombians will choose their next president at the ballot box by themselves, or whether foreign powers will shape the final decision. 

Some context. Colombia is governed today by Gustavo Petro, the country’s first leftist president, whose term ends this year. Tomorrow’s vote chooses his successor, and the two finalists could not be more different. 

Iván Cepeda is a philosopher, senator from the governing coalition, and lifelong human rights advocate. He runs on a platform of continuity, pledging to carry Petro’s agenda further: redistribution of wealth funded by taxing the richest Colombians, an energy transition away from fossil fuels, agrarian reform, and a negotiated peace with the country’s armed groups. 

Abelardo de la Espriella is a far-right lawyer and political newcomer. He promises a hardline, military-led security agenda, mass prisons modeled on those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, and a 40% cut to public spending. He has pledged to align Colombia with U.S. security initiatives, and his campaign relies more on rallies, social media, and church networks than on detailed plans. 

De la Espriella finished first by under three points. The race is genuinely open. 

What happened after that first round sharpened the real question. In recent days, foreign figures have openly inserted themselves into Colombia’s campaign. 

It began in Washington. President Trump posted his “Complete and Total Endorsement” on Truth Social, and de la Espriella answered on X, casting the two countries as “sister nations” bound to defend Western civilization. A chorus followed. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, whom de la Espriella met privately this year, said Washington would be “very forceful in guaranteeing” a free and fair vote. U.S. Representative María Elvira Salazar urged Colombians to rally behind him, and U.S. Senator Bernie Moreno, who watched the first round as an observer, is expected back for the runoff. 

It did not stop there. Beyond Washington, de la Espriella has secured the unconditional support of other leaders including Presidents Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, José Antonio Kast of Chile and Argentina’s Javier Milei, who interpreted the result as a rejection of the “failed socialist model” and said the forces of freedom across the region were watching and lending their support. From Madrid, Vox leader Santiago Abascal said Colombians could recover the “sovereignty taken from them.” 

Each framed it the same way: as a defense of Colombia’s freedom and even its sovereignty. 

That is the contradiction at the heart of this election. Sovereignty and freedom are not gifts foreign politicians can hand a country by meddling in its vote. They are the very things such interference denies. Nor is this happening in isolation. Since President Donald Trump reshaped American politics, a familiar style has spread: elections become contests to be won by any means, opponents are cast as enemies, and institutions are treated as obstacles. That style is no longer staying home. It is carried across borders by a networked right, by officials willing to amplify it, and by compliant allies in the region eager to satisfy Washington for their own gain. This weekend, Colombia is where the line is drawn. 

Still, the decision belongs to Colombians alone, and not everyone abroad has forgotten that. In Washington, House Democrats led by Rep. Jim McGovern condemned the endorsements as an “insult” to Colombian sovereignty, insisting the country’s future belongs to its own voters. In Brussels, members of the European Parliament formally condemned Trump’s open backing of de la Espriella and his branding of Cepeda as a “radical leftist Marxist,” urging the EU to reject any attempt — political, diplomatic, economic, or rhetorical — to interfere in the vote. Electoral processes, they wrote, belong solely to citizens; self-determination, sovereignty, and non-interference apply to every country regardless of its politics or strategic value. 

Tomorrow, the world will be watching Colombia. What happens will echo across Latin America in every debate about sovereignty, democracy, and whether progressive governments can survive and transfer power under mounting external pressure. 

Global Exchange will be there throughout, standing with local partners and amplifying Colombian voices. Our colleagues at Rompeviento TV are reporting live from the ground. Follow them, and us, for results and analysis: 

Instagram: @globalexchange
YouTube: @RompevientoTV

Tomorrow, Colombians decide. The only question is whether they will be allowed to do so freely.

June 1, 2026

Colombia is one of the last major left-progressive governments still standing in the Americas. On Sunday, its people voted in record numbers on what comes next. The result is not yet decided, but the forces trying to decide it for them are already visible.

Far-right attorney Abelardo de la Espriella came in first with 43.74%. Left-wing senator Iván Cepeda placed second at 40.90%. Neither reached the 50% required to win outright. A runoff is set for June 21. Between now and then, everything is at play, and the outcome will reverberate far beyond Colombia’s borders. 

The Numbers Tell a Bigger Story

Sunday’s election broke records on multiple fronts. Voter turnout reached 57.88% of the electoral census, the highest abstention drop in a first round since the 1991 Constitution. Over 23.9 million valid votes were cast, compared to 21.5 million in 2022. Colombia’s citizens showed up. 

Both candidates broke every 2022 benchmark. And yet: 17.4 million eligible Colombians did not vote. The country remains deeply divided — geographically, socially, and politically — and that division will be the terrain on which the next three weeks unfold. 

Contested Results and the Integrity Question

The night did not end in consensus. Senator Cepeda declined to accept the preliminary count, citing a reported discrepancy of approximately 885,000 IDs registered to the National Registry prior to election day, as well as allegations of voting stations moved without notice and what he called undue foreign intervention — naming Ecuador specifically. He has called on electoral scrutiny commissions to clarify these irregularities before his campaign makes any formal statement on the results.

President Gustavo Petro also refused to recognize the preliminary count, maintaining objections he has raised for months about the outsourcing of election logistics to a company whose owners have fraud convictions. 

De la Espriella responded from Barranquilla — floating on a ferry on the Magdalena River before thousands of supporters — with escalating language, calling Cepeda a “narcotrafficker” and labeling Petro a “drug addict.” He declared he would “defend democracy by reason or by force.”    

That is the tone of this campaign with three weeks remaining.

The U.S. Role — Hiding in Plain Sight

For the first time in Colombian history, the U.S. Embassy sent 86 formally accredited observers to the polls. Among them: Senator Bernie Moreno — born in Bogotá, close Trump ally — who weeks earlier had warned that Washington might refuse to recognize results if evidence of coercion emerged — and conditioned future U.S. assistance explicitly on the election’s outcome. Days before the election, Republican Senator María Elvira Salazar went further — publicly endorsing de la Espriella and urging Colombians to vote for him. After the vote, Moreno reported that the elections were “completely free and well run.”   

Ecuador played its part too. President Noboa had imposed tariffs of up to 100% on Colombian imports throughout the campaign. The day before the election, he and de la Espriella held a public video call announcing the tariffs would be lifted — marketed as a political triumph for the candidate. What neither mentioned: the Andean Community Secretary General had already issued a ruling ordering their removal. The deal was a performance. 

And then there is de la Espriella’s own post-election appeal: from his victory speech, he explicitly called on “the United States and democratic countries” to monitor the second round. The frontrunner is already asking the United States to stand watch over what comes next. 

What Comes Next: Three Weeks, One Decision

The math is close. De la Espriella leads by roughly 673,000 votes — under 3 percentage points — and the right is already consolidating: Uribe and Valencia have endorsed him. Centrist Sergio Fajardo’s million votes remain uncommitted. In a race this tight, they could decide everything.

For Cepeda, the path is clear — and difficult. He must hold Petro’s coalition while winning voters who did not choose him in the first round. His opening move of contesting the results, however legitimate the concerns, risks reading as weakness to the center he needs. The campaign must pivot fast: from defense to offense. 

But the left is not without structural advantage. It enters this second round with territorial organization, regional leadership, and an electoral base that simply did not exist a decade ago. Elections are not decided by who shouts loudest — they are decided by who moves more people to the polls. On that count, the race remains open. 

Colombia has voted before under pressure. It has held elections through armed conflict, political violence, and external interference. Its democracy is durable. But durability is not the same as invulnerability — and this cycle, more than most, is testing the line between the two.

What happens in Colombia on June 21 will not stay in Colombia. It will send a signal to every progressive movement in the hemisphere about whether it is possible to govern — and to be succeeded — under the weight of the Donroe Doctrine.

We were there Sunday. We will be there June 21. 

May 28, 2026

This Sunday, May 31, Colombia holds its presidential election. If you care about U.S. foreign policy, democracy in the Americas, or the direction of the hemisphere under the Trump administration — this vote deserves your full attention.

The question Colombia is actually answering

Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin America and will decide much more than its next government. It enters this vote as one of the last major left-progressive governments standing in the region. Mexico holds under Claudia Sheinbaum. Brazil votes in October, with Lula seeking a fourth term. Colombia votes now. If this government falls, the bloc fractures — and a defeat in Bogotá three months before Brazil goes to the polls would be a powerful gift to those who want to declare the Latin American progressive cycle finished.

The race centers on three figures: left-wing Iván Cepeda, senator of the Pacto Histórico, running on continuity and the deepening of reforms Petro could not consolidate; and right-wing candidates Abelardo de la Espriella of the Defensores de la Patria movement and Paloma Valencia of Centro Democrático. The center has found no oxygen in a country divided into two irreconcilable blocs. If no candidate clears 50% on Sunday, the top two advance to a runoff on June 21 — a second round that would almost certainly be when Washington’s implicit preferences become explicit.

The U.S. role — and the pattern of interference

The Trump administration has made no secret of its intention to reshape Latin America in its favor. The approach even has a name: the “Donroe Doctrine” — Trump’s own update of the Monroe Doctrine, the 19th-century principle that declared the Western Hemisphere America’s exclusive sphere of influence. Under this framework, Washington has already launched a military operation in Venezuela, tightened sanctions on Cuba, threatened military action against Mexico, threatened to retake the Panama Canal, pressured courts in Brazil after the sentencing of former president Bolsonaro, intervened in Argentina’s elections, and pardoned former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández — a man convicted on drug trafficking charges in a U.S. federal court — as part of a broader strategy of rewarding regional alignment.

Colombia is next on that list, and not by coincidence. Washington’s closest security partner in South America for decades, it has also become its most inconvenient one — Petro’s defense of sovereignty, his ties with Venezuela, and his criticism of U.S. drug policy created friction that hasn’t gone away. The country shares more than 2,200 kilometers of border with Venezuela and hosts nearly three million Venezuelan migrants; for Washington, which has floated incorporating Venezuela as a 51st state, a Bogotá government that keeps Caracas close is a genuine hemispheric inconvenience. 

Ecuador has already acted as a pressure lever. President Noboa imposed tariffs of 30%, then 50%, then 100% on Colombian imports — ostensibly over border security, but with political timing that has been impossible to ignore. Days before the election, right-wing candidate Paloma Valencia announced a call with Noboa in which he offered to reduce those tariffs to 75%. The choreography was plain: the Colombia–Ecuador border is also an electoral front.

Washington has also secured formal presence on election day itself. The National Electoral Council confirmed that 86 U.S. Embassy officials have been accredited as international observers for the May 31 vote — presented as a transparency measure, but arriving directly after Washington expressed concern about threats against right-wing candidates. The question of who, exactly, Washington is observing is not rhetorical.

And then there is HondurasGate. In leaked audio recordings, a voice identified as former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández — already pardoned by Washington — describes building an “information cell” to target left-wing governments across the region. He names Colombia and Mexico explicitly as targets of an effort backed by actors in Honduras, the United States, Israel, and Argentina.

This is the playbook for removing inconvenient governments — one that no longer requires a military coup. It runs through coordinated media pressure, diplomatic isolation, financial coercion, and timed electoral interference. Colombia is named directly. It votes this Sunday 

On the ground, the stakes are personal

Colombia’s three leading candidates have not shared a single debate during this entire campaign. In a country still healing from decades of armed conflict, that silence is telling — and dangerous. 

In just one week, between April 24 and 30, Colombia saw drone attacks on military installations, explosive devices on highways, and a bomb that killed 22 people and left 37 wounded. In multiple regions, election authorities have requested military escorts to protect polling stations. For many Colombians, voting on Sunday is not a routine civic act. It is an act of courage.

That is the election Washington is observing. That is the election we will be watching, too.

We will be there

This Sunday, Global Exchange will be on the ground monitoring the vote alongside trusted Colombian and regional partner organizations — providing independent coverage from election day through the final count. Follow our live coverage on Instagram.

What happens in Colombia this Sunday will not stay in Colombia. For Americans, it is a direct window into how their government’s power is being exercised — right now, in their name — in a democracy south of the border. For the hemisphere, it is a verdict on something more fundamental: whether a country can still vote freely when the Donroe Doctrine has already decided what the answer should be.

Author: Karen Dayana Mosquera Palacios
This is an English translation of the article originally published in Spanish by La Ceiba. Read the original version at laceiba.lat.
On May 31, the third most populous country in Latin America will decide far more than its next government.

Colombia as Hinge: The Right Turn in Latin America and What This Election Can Break or Confirm

Latin America is living through one of the most intense electoral cycles of the past decade in 2026. Peru, Colombia, and Brazil will elect presidents throughout the year in a regional landscape where the second Trump administration has ceased to be a distant actor and has become a direct variable in the internal politics of several countries. U.S. foreign policy is openly transactional and interventionist: ranging from the military operation in Venezuela at the start of the year and the tightening of the blockade against Cuba, to threats to take control of the Panama Canal, diplomatic and tariff coercion against Mexico, and pressure on Brazilian justice following the conviction of former President Jair Bolsonaro for his coup attempt.

Recent cases are notable. In Honduras, Trump posted on his X account, just hours before polls opened, that he would pardon former President Juan Orlando Hernández — convicted of drug trafficking in the United States — if Nasry Asfura, a candidate from the same party, won. After a disputed counting process that dragged on for months, Asfura was declared the winner and Juan Orlando regained his freedom. In Argentina, Trump openly conditioned U.S. financial support on a victory by Javier Milei’s party in the October 26, 2025 legislative elections. Two countries, two elections, the same hand. The pattern is not new, but it has never been so explicit.

The Latin American political map clearly shows that the three major progressive left governments still standing in the region are Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia. Mexico maintains a degree of stability under Claudia Sheinbaum. Brazil, however, votes in October, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will seek a fourth term. Colombia votes now. If this government falls, the bloc fractures.

The effect is not automatic. Brazil has a different scale, a different capacity for resistance, and its own internal and regional dynamics. But symbolism matters in politics, and a defeat in Colombia three months before the Brazilian elections would be, at best, a rhetorical gift for those seeking to prove that the Latin American progressive cycle has failed and is reaching its end. At worst, it would represent a blow to the close and deeply integrated relations built under the Petro and Lula governments, and would put at risk the possible consolidation of a bloc of resistance to Trumpian hegemony in the hemisphere. What Colombia decides on May 31 does not belong to, nor does it only affect, Colombia. 

The Electoral Map: Three Candidates, Two Poles, and a Weakened Center

Colombia is living through a historic moment in its democratic life: it is the first time the left is not only defending the power it won four years ago, but also seeking to preserve it and consolidate it as a long-term national project.

The March 8, 2026 legislative elections marked a milestone. The progressive forces represented in the Pacto Histórico — the ruling party — achieved their best-ever result in Congress and won more votes than any other party in the country, securing 25 seats. That is not a majority; Congress remains dominated by the right, but it is a sign that there is an electorate that did not vote for Petro and his party as a protest vote, but is actually identifying with a project. 

That changes the nature of the dispute. It is no longer about whether the left can reach power. It is about a political force that has been consolidating itself and now contests whether it can stay there. That shift is what makes these elections different from all previous ones and complicates the analysis of Colombia from both within and outside.

A few days before the first round, the electoral landscape is defined by a polarization that leaves no room for the center. Fourteen candidates registered with the National Registry, but voting intention has concentrated around three figures. Iván Cepeda Castro, senator for the Pacto Histórico, leads all polls with between 38% and 40% of voting intention. He is followed by Abelardo de la Espriella of the Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) movement, at around 24%, and Senator Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre), with approximately 19%.

Centrist figures such as Sergio Fajardo and Claudia López fail to gain traction in the polls. Their candidacies illustrate something deeper: Colombian society is divided into two blocs and there is no oxygen for intermediate positions.

The fragmentation of the right-wing vote and the nonexistent center is, paradoxically, the factor that could most benefit Cepeda. His campaign hopes that the contest between De la Espriella and Valencia for the conservative electorate will allow him to win in the first round — unprecedented in Colombian history for a left-wing candidate.

Cepeda represents continuity with Petro’s political project and promises to deepen policies and reforms that Petro was unable to consolidate. De la Espriella and Valencia, though rivals, agree on the fundamentals: dismantling current government policies, a hard line against criminal structures, and the return of Colombia to the role of Washington’s main ally in the region. These are two distinct national visions, and the consequences of each extend well beyond Bogotá.

The Pressure No One Names, but Everyone Feels

To say there is major external interest in the results of Colombia’s presidential elections is not speculation — it is a reality. And since January 2026 it has an official name: the “Donroe Doctrine.” The concept — fusing Donald Trump’s name with the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine, and asserting in essence that “America is for the Americans” — was adopted by the U.S. president himself following the military operation in Venezuela.  What was conceived in the 19th century as a warning to European powers not to intervene in the Western Hemisphere is today the ideological justification for Washington to openly intervene in the political affairs of its southern neighbors, under the argument that the Western Hemisphere is its natural and inviolable sphere of influence.

Colombia is not a peripheral case within that doctrine. It is a central one. The country shares more than 2,200 kilometers of border with Venezuela and hosts approximately three million Venezuelan migrants, meaning that any instability in the neighboring country immediately becomes a matter of Colombian domestic policy. For Washington — which has explicitly raised the possibility of incorporating Venezuela as the 51st U.S. state — it is strategically important that the next government in Bogotá align itself with its regional policy and support its position toward Caracas. 

A government that continues the Petro line, which maintained diplomatic relations with Maduro and openly criticized U.S. pressure on Venezuela, represents a genuine hemispheric inconvenience for the White House.

The case of Ecuador illustrates how that pressure can also operate through closest neighbors. President Daniel Noboa, invoking a lack of control and cooperation by the Colombian government on border security and the greater fiscal and military burden Ecuador has had to assume to contain criminal structures operating in that zone, decided as a retaliatory measure to impose 30% tariffs on Colombian imports in February, raised them to 50% in March, and announced they would reach 100% as of May 1.

Two readings can be made of this unilateral decision. The first: the Ecuadorian president, despite acting against Ecuador’s international obligations, wants to pressure Colombia into adopting a stance more aligned with his country’s position on cross-border security. 

The second, a political reading: to tip the electoral balance toward candidates closer to his positions. Just days ago, Centro Democrático candidate Paloma Valencia announced a call she held with Noboa, in which the Ecuadorian president offered to reduce tariffs to 75%. The maneuver exposed what was already evident: the Colombia-Ecuador border is also a political front where the Colombian election is being fought with tariffs and diplomatic pressure.

When one observes the patterns shared between these Ecuadorian presidential decisions and those of President Trump, it is impossible not to ask what role Washington plays in the decisions being made from Quito. Is it mere ideological influence? Is Noboa signaling to Trump to consolidate himself as his best ally in the region? Or is he acting on concrete directives from Washington? What is clear is that these policies — which are openly contrary to international law — have been directed exclusively at governments that Washington has declared opposed to its interests.

It should be recalled that, before his dispute with Colombia, Noboa imposed a 27% tariff on Mexican imports in 2025, shortly after the United States imposed tariffs on Mexico. That decision came amid diplomatic tensions following the 2024 rupture in relations, when Ecuadorian police violently broke into the Mexican embassy in Quito to arrest former Vice President Jorge Glas, violating the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 

Colombia and Mexico have something in common: they are governments Washington has repeatedly identified as contrary to its interests. That Noboa has exerted economic and diplomatic pressure on both, with a synchronization that is hard to ignore, is an open question that no one has formally answered, but that many in the region are asking.

Adding to this chain of external pressures on the Colombian elections is the Honduras Gate scandal, which serves as an illustration of an intervention model that does not arrive as a declaration of war, but as coordination between local and international actors and carefully orchestrated media positioning. 

In the leaked audio recordings, a voice identified as that of former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández claims the Israeli government played a decisive role in his pardon and release in the United States, speaks of creating an information cell to launch operations against left-wing governments in the region, and explicitly mentions that “some dossiers against Mexico and Colombia are coming,” all with the backing of actors in Honduras, the United States, Israel, Argentina, and other conservative sectors of the region. 

Regardless of the arguments used to dismiss these revelations, what is certain is that this story gave names, figures, and conversations to a network that many in the region suspected existed. With that precedent on the table, asking whether Colombia will be the target of interventions to influence the presidential result is not a rhetorical question. It is a genuine one. 

Who Does Washington Back?

Explicit support from the Trump administration for a specific Colombian candidate has been, until now, less visible than in other recent electoral processes in the region. That is probably no coincidence. Open endorsement before the first round can produce the opposite effect in a Colombian electorate deeply divided over U.S. interference in internal affairs. The strategy Washington appears to be adopting is to reserve that support for the second round, where all conservative sectors will seek to unite to defeat Iván Cepeda. 

The absence of a declaration does not mean the absence of a position. The tension Petro maintained with the White House throughout his government — criticizing U.S. foreign policy on migration, peace, and security, from the war in Gaza to military operations against vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific as a prelude to the military incursion into Venezuela — left a mark that does not disappear with a visit. 

Washington has sent clear signals: the decertification of Colombia as a reliable partner in the fight against drug trafficking, combined with the State Department’s designation of Colombian armed groups as terrorist organizations, directly aligns U.S. security policy with the agenda of right-wing candidates and constitutes an explicit criticism of the negotiated peace policy that the Petro government called “Total Peace.” 

Added to this is a detail that should not be read as a neutral gesture: the United States will be an international observer at the May 31 elections. The National Electoral Council confirmed it accredited 86 members of the U.S. embassy to monitor the vote in various cities across the country. The official statement framed it as a cooperation strategy to strengthen the transparency of the process. But this action comes after the U.S. government publicly expressed concern about threats against right-wing candidates such as Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella — which raises an uncomfortable question: what does Washington mean by transparency, and exactly who is it watching?

Despite the fact that open hostility between Trump and Petro eased following the Colombian president’s visit to the White House in February, relations between Bogotá and Washington remain the most strained of the recent democratic period.

If there is a second round — to be held June 21 — that implicit support will likely become explicit. And when it does, the Colombian election will formally become yet another episode in the long history of U.S. intervention in Latin American electoral processes, and a possible win for the regional reconfiguration Washington has been executing under the “Donroe” doctrine.

Violence and Fraud: The Scenarios Nobody Wants in Colombia

While international attention focuses on the name of Colombia’s next president, Colombians are living through this process under pressure and division without parallel in their recent democratic history. 

Polarization is so deep that Colombia will go to the polls on May 31 without the three leading candidates having shared a single presidential debate — each deflecting with the excuse of not wanting to participate in polarized settings. It is difficult to speak of democracy and reconciliation in a country so marked by violence when those aspiring to the Casa de Nariño (Colombia’s presidential palace, equivalent to the White House) cannot even agree to attend a public debate.

The absence of debate does not occur in a vacuum. The tone was set by the assassination of presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in 2025 — the first signal that this campaign would not be an ordinary process. To that targeted political violence is added the violence experienced by local leaders in regions where the state barely reaches, and the violence unleashed directly on the civilian population. 

In a single week, between April 24 and 30, dozens of violent and terrorist actions were recorded: drone attacks on military installations, cylinder bombs on roads, and an explosive charge detonated as vehicles passed that killed 22 people and wounded 37. Several attacks failed to hit their targets but added to a sustained campaign of terror, as reported by INDEPAZ. The National Registrar, Hernán Penagos, also requested special reinforcement from security forces for several areas of the country where illegal armed groups directly threaten the conduct of the electoral day. In those regions, voting is not a civic routine. It is an act of courage. 

Questions about the transparency of the electoral process complete the complex picture. Before the March legislative elections, President Petro denounced the possibility of electoral fraud based on the alleged manipulation of the software used by the National Registry for vote counting, sparking a national debate about the reliability of the system. 

Oversight bodies have defended its soundness and highlighted that the software has undergone technical audits, including international reviews. That this debate exists just days before a presidential election in such a polarized country — with external actors who have declared interests in the outcome — is not a minor detail. 

What Colombia Is Telling the World

Colombia votes on May 31 under the conditions this article has described: with high levels of violence, without debates, and with doubts about the transparency of its electoral system — while the hemisphere’s leading power has already militarily threatened the country, cut its diplomatic aid, calls its outgoing president a criminal, and operates militarily in its waters under the “Donroe” Doctrine, the ideological justification with which Washington has declared this hemisphere its operational backyard. 

This is not a fictional scenario. It is the real one.

In that context, what Colombians decide on May 31 is a political act of a magnitude that goes far beyond choosing a government. It is an imperfect response, taken under pressure, to the most urgent question Latin America faces today: Can a Latin American democracy decide for itself under the “Donroe” Doctrine?

Brazil will hear the answer in October. Mexico will read it immediately. Washington already knows what it wants. The only real unknown is what Colombians will decide.

April 14, 2026

As Colombia moves toward its presidential elections on May 31, the country stands at a pivotal political crossroads — one that will not only shape its domestic future, but also carry significant implications for Latin America as a whole.

Often described as one of the last remaining strongholds of progressive governance in the region, Colombia now faces an electoral cycle marked by intense political competition, shifting alliances, and growing polarization. The results of the March 8 legislative elections have already begun to redraw the political map. A fragmented Congress, the absence of clear governing majorities, and an increasingly complex path toward coalition-building are defining what comes next. Presidential candidates are now positioning themselves in what is shaping up to be a highly competitive and uncertain race, one that the rest of the region is watching closely.

Yet the deeper challenges facing Colombian democracy are not new — and they will not be resolved at the ballot box alone.

For communities that have lived through decades of armed conflict, the 2016 Peace Agreement represented a promise that politics, not violence, would be the terrain on which Colombia’s future was decided. That promise remains unfulfilled. Victims and former peace signatories who have tried to enter political life continue to face obstacles that formal guarantees have done little to remove. At the same time, in the wake of the legislative elections, questions about the reliability of the electoral system itself — including how votes are counted, who oversees the process, and whether institutions can be trusted — have moved to the center of public debate.

These questions will follow Colombia all the way to May 31.

This Thursday, we invite you to join us for the webinar Elections in Colombia: Challenges for Democracy, where we will take a closer look at this moment through the perspectives of those directly engaged in it.

Featured speakers:

Aura Camargo Mercado is a social leader and victim of Colombia’s armed conflict, and a former candidate for the Special Transitional Peace Districts (CITREP) — constituencies created for communities most affected by the conflict. She brings a firsthand perspective on the limitations that victims and peace agreement signatories face in accessing the right to be elected.

Rubén D. Acosta O., Scrutiny Delegate before Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE), brings a clear view of how the electoral system functions in practice, where it falls short, and what the coming months will demand of it.

Together, they offer something rarely available in these conversations: a grounded, firsthand account of what Colombian democracy looks like from within.

Colombia is entering a decisive phase. We hope you will be part of the conversation.