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Introduction
Seven elections observers visited Oaxaca City, Yojovi, San Agustín Loxicha, Miahuatlán, and Santiago Xanica. Six others visited communities in the coastal region including Pinotepa Nacional, Tlacamama, Jamiltepec, San Pedro Tututepec, La Luz, and Río Grande. The Oaxaca group included scholars and academics, students, an administrative assistant, an accountant, and Global Exchange representatives. The observers conducted extensive interviews with members of the Oaxaca Council of IFE Directors, IFE staff, Alianza Cívica, representatives from opposition parties including the PRD, PAN, and PCD, various NGOs, human rights and religious organizations, local government officials, polling officials, and citizens. The observers made pre-electoral investigations and visited a variety of voting stations on election day. The observers focused on rural areas where serious poverty and the presence of security forces posed special challenges for the electoral process.
Pre-Electoral Context
Based on 1990 statistics, Oaxaca's population of 3,072,000 citizens includes indigenous language speakers: 724,000 Zapotecos, 369,000 Mixtecos, 188,000 Mixes, and 108,000 Mazatecos, many of whom live in small, isolated communities. The National Council on Population found that 76 percent of Oaxaca's 570 municipalities contain high or extremely high levels of poverty as measured by income, housing, and education.
In Oaxaca, 418 municipalities have chosen not to use contests between parties to elect local officials. Instead, as is allowed by Oaxaca state law, they choose their leaders through usage and customs (usos y costumbres), local practices rooted in indigenous systems of community service which give particular importance to the judgment of elders, open assemblies, and consensus. For access to government resources, however, these communities remain dependent on the PRI-controlled political system. In many cases this has enabled local political leaders to gain power and subvert community autonomy through the manipulation of usos y costumbres.
The PRD has won local elections in key areas such as Juchitán, as the PAN has in Oaxaca City, but the PRI still dominates state politics and military affairs. The PRI recently won the governorship with 47 percent of the vote and control of 114 of the 152 municipalities that practice party politics instead of usos y costumbres. In addition to PRI control of the police and state judicial hierarchy, in 1996 the PRI began to intervene in municipal politics with a strong military presence, particularly in the aftermath of actions by the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR). In Xanica, for instance, the community has feared the return of the military who occupied their community for six weeks; in Loxicha long-term military presence produced an atmosphere of intimidation that clouded the electoral process.
Role of IFE and Electoral Reforms
In Oaxaca, institutional reforms and civic projects considerably aided advances toward the democratization of the federal elections. Many civic organizations demonstrated concerted efforts to inform the rural population of their electoral rights, including: the IFE, Alianza Cívica, progressive members of the Catholic Church, activists of the PRD-dominated Alianza por México, and community projects supported by the Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia (MCD) and the National Indigenous Institute (INI). Efforts included training citizens to be electoral observers, distributing pamphlets and posters illustrating the voting process, advising citizens of their right to a free and secret ballot, and warning against vote buying.
The local IFE council stated that it successfully recruited and trained 27,426 randomly-selected volunteers to staff 99.9 percent of the 3,922 voting stations in the state, despite difficulties in the recruitment and training process. The IFE lost access to mass media for recruitment at a vital point. Also, it lost potential recruits to migration, lack of citizen status, or and personal, religious or gender-related reasons. Attrition of recruits for IFE volunteers raised concerns that pressured potential volunteers to drop out.
Oaxaca's countryside presented a number of challenges to the IFE's efforts such as potential irregularities due to usos y costumbres customs. About half of the municipalities governed by usos y costumbres held general assemblies to deliberate whether to allow voting stations in their communities. While all but two municipalities choose to do so, it is likely that many continued to use traditional, communal practices such as public assemblies and non-secret voting.
Another difficulty the IFE encountered was illiteracy and the low level of education endemic in rural areas. The IFE had difficulty training volunteers and accrediting local electoral observers. In the regions of Pinotepa Nacional, San Juan Colorado, Xanica, and Río Grande, IFE representatives were sometimes unclear about important procedures. The community radio station XEJAM broadcast informational messages about the elections in Mixtec, but aside from this effort, little election information reached rural communities in indigenous languages. The IFE itself could not find bilingual trainers to instruct indigenous IFE volunteers, to produce training materials, or to provide media outreach.
Intimidation and Militarization
Impunity contributes to the climate of militarization and intimidation in Oaxaca. PRI candidates and authorities are often in a position to threaten or commit acts of violence and intimidation without fear of criminal proceedings. Authorities who commit such acts have the option to appeal to the PRI governor who controls the state police and judiciary.
One such case of intimidation occurred when the municipal agent Soriano Díaz reproached Lucia Valencia for organizing a workshop on voting rights, claiming that such activities divided the community and created a climate of violence. Mr. Díaz warned Ms. Valencia that if she held another workshop, he would take the matter to the Municipal President of San Pedro Tututepec or to the governor of Oaxaca.
Another case of intimidation with impunity occurred when authorities incarcerated a Mixe individual two weeks before the elections. He had previously spoken out at a public meeting against the PRI congressional candidate, Cándido Coheto Martínez. The authorities subsequently deprived the prisoner of all contact with his family. The individual later died in his prison cell, apparently a victim of police brutality.
In Loxicha, the ongoing imprisonment of over 80 men is another example of intimidation. The electoral observers met with women who are part of a group that has held demonstrations in front of the government offices in Oaxaca City over the past three years to protest human rights violations in their communities. Many of the demonstrators' charges are directed toward the current Municipal President and former officer of the Judicial Police, Lucio Vásquez Ramírez. According to testimony, in 1996 an alleged fatal guerilla attack on a police station in the resort town of Huatulco set off a wave of repression against the indigenous communities. Actions against the communities included the arbitrary arrest of municipal authorities and bilingual teachers, and other arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, and murders. The military presence has increased under the pretext of combating alleged drug trafficking and community involvement with the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR).
The electoral observers themselves experienced the effects of the militarization during their visit to Oaxaca. To reach the municipal capital, Loxicha, they passed through a military checkpoint known as a Base de Operación Mixta where state and federal Judicial Police work in conjunction with the army. Upon the arrival of the observers, approximately 20 police, some out of uniform, detained the observers, checked identification, and recorded names. Authorities forced the observers to repeat the process twice before reaching Loxicha. The police also accompanied observers to and from polling sites.
Vote Buying, Coercion, and the Misuse of State Resources
In Oaxaca, elections observers collected reports of vote buying and coercion committed primarily by the PRI, but in two cases by the PAN and PRD. Such practices are widespread, often accepted as the norm, and may have potentially affected electoral outcome in rural areas.
In Chila, Río Grande, and Chacagua, beneficiaries of Progresa and Procampo reported that local promoters of these programs and the municipal president of San Pedro Tututepec himself, Ramiro Herrera, threatened to end benefits to those that do not vote for the PRI.
Four days before the elections, a representative of the governor attended a gathering in the community of Zoogocho with officials from 14 communities. The representative threatened that if the community members did not vote for the PRI, "many doors would close," implying that their benefits would be discontinued.
In Río Grande, Chacagua, La Luz, and San Pedro Tututepec, observers received many reports of the PRI distributing basic goods (dispensas), including chickens, cement, hoes, shovels, paint brushes, pails, roofing materials, credit, cash, and promising housing, electricity, a hospital, pavement of streets, bread shops, and corn grinding mills, as a means of winning votes or garnering attendance at PRI rallies.
In Río Grande, Puerto Escondido, Chila, El Mamey, and Colotepec observers received reports that PRI government officials warehoused disaster relief material for victims of Hurricane Paulina in 1998 and the earthquake of September 1999 and then distributed the materials in the weeks prior to the elections.
Residents of Jolotepec, Tututepec, and El Mamey reported that officials were distributing materials in a partisan fashion. On June 30, two days before the elections, observers found authorities distributing cement from a local storage house located on the Pinotepa Nacional-Puerto Escondido Highway. The officials gave about 55 people from El Ciruelo and Jicaltepec six bags of cement each. Women at the site testified that the PRI distributed the cement, and that the Municipal President, Alvaro Baños, had told the recipients they were all to vote for the PRI.
In many cases, vote buying involved improper use of voter credentials. In Río Grande the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), a PRI-affiliated campesino organization, distributed 2,000 chickens a week prior to the elections. The organization charged recipients a nominal fee for the chickens and asked them to show their voter credential and to sign their names, urging them to vote for the PRI.
The frequency of vote buying in rural areas is exacerbated by a widespread acceptance of the practice. Although many citizens reported vote buying to the IFE, no one had filed a formal charge until two days before the elections. In Yojovi, a team from Alianza Cívica and the PRD helped local officials file formal charges accusing the PRI candidate for Congress, Cándido Coheto Martínez, of large-scale vote buying and coercion. Coheto delivered 88 machetes to citizens, forcing them to sign a form. He also illegally demanded copies of voter credentials from individuals who were to receive fertilizer and chickens from the head of the Women's Committee. The local officials sent Coheto copies of the credentials, although the individuals received neither the fertilizer nor the chickens.
According to IFE and Alianza Cívica, it is difficult to determine the impact of vote buying and coercion on the outcome of particular elections. Testimony indicated that many individuals had heard and understood the IFE message that the vote was intended to be 'free and secret.' However, Alianza Cívica, the Catholic Church, and NGOs in Oaxaca believe many rural citizens feel obligated to vote for PRI, the party distributing goods and services, because citizens have 'given their word' or because they do not understand the way their vote will be ascertained.
Election Day Observations
Overall, electoral violations were minor and occurred as a result of the newness of the voting process, the inability of some voters to read the ballot, and the physical conditions of the voting station. However, significant irregularities did occur.
In Santa Rosa de Lima, observers saw an IFE volunteer peering into the voting booth as individuals voted and then acknowledging those who voted for the PRI. One observer learned from the IFE representative that this volunteer had dismissed two original volunteers and pressured the IFE to hire him in their stead.
In La Luz, a PRI party official distributed dispensas to citizens immediately after they voted.
Significant electoral violations occurred in the militarized municipality of Loxicha. IFE volunteers were not chosen at random and were poorly trained because, according to the IFE representative, those they initially chose declined to participate out of fear. Heavily armed police officers were illegally present at voting stations. Unauthorized PRI representatives also intimidated voters at several voting stations.
At a voting station in PRI-dominated Tovala Copalita, observers witnessed a wide variety of irregularities. Overall, the voting station was extremely disorganized, making it impossible to ensure that the procedures were being followed properly. The voting station was located on the small porch of a local government office where those who identified themselves as authorities conducted business and watched the voting from just a few meters away. PRI propaganda was visible to voters in the basketball court where they waited in line and in the building itself. The majority of voters arrived by truck, and one of the drivers confirmed that the municipal government paid for the service in violation of electoral law. An IFE volunteer in the position of "second examiner" assumed most of the duties of "president," and the PAN representative marked the credentials, although upon inspection, it was discovered that he had consistently marked them incorrectly. The IFE volunteers rarely used the indelible ink even after the IFE representative instructed them to do so. At least one man voted twice, and IFE volunteers allowed at least three individuals to vote even though they did not appear on the official list.
Illiteracy and lack of education affected election day activities as well as pre-electoral conditions. Observers noted that many voters, mostly from indigenous communities, had little individual voting experience and needed guidance in the ballot marking process. At rural sites, typically 5 to 10 percent of the ballots were annulled because they were marked incorrectly.
Conclusion
In Oaxaca, the IFE achieved marked success in guaranteeing relatively free and secret elections for urban citizens and made important strides in many rural areas. One sign of this achievement was the mood on the morning of July 3 at the regional collection site for ballot boxes in Miahuatlán. As IFE officials and volunteers brought in their specially marked cases, they expressed pride in having taken part in a process with unprecedented high levels of openness, neutrality, and transparency.
Nevertheless, the pre-electoral conditions of these elections indicate that the political rights of citizens and the legitimacy of election results in rural areas in Oaxaca were threatened in serious ways. Concerns for future elections in Oaxaca should include:
Whether or not the electoral processes will be developed for communities that practice usos y costumbres so that they may take part in state and federal elections without compromising their right to continue local governance with respect for indigenous traditions. Whether or not areas such as Loxicha will be free of militarization, misuse of police power, and intimidation. Whether or not state elections will be considered illegitimate should illegally bought or coerced votes influence results, as they may have in these elections considering the margin by which the PRI presidential and congressional candidates won in Oaxaca. Whether or not federal investigators and electoral tribunals will adapt procedures to assure that one may challenge illegitimate electoral results in a timely and effective way in order to guarantee the political right to representation.