Oaxaca
Introduction
Seven elections observers visited Oaxaca City, Yojovi, San Agustín
Loxicha, Miahuatlán, and Santiago Xanica. Six others visited
communities in the coastal region including Pinotepa Nacional,
Tlacamama, Jamiltepec, San Pedro Tututepec, La Luz, and Río
Grande. The Oaxaca group included scholars and academics, students, an
administrative assistant, an accountant, and Global Exchange
representatives. The observers conducted extensive interviews with
members of the Oaxaca Council of IFE Directors, IFE staff, Alianza
Cívica, representatives from opposition parties including the PRD,
PAN, and PCD, various NGOs, human rights and religious organizations,
local government officials, polling officials, and citizens. The
observers made pre-electoral investigations and visited a variety of
voting stations on election day. The observers focused on rural areas
where serious poverty and the presence of security forces posed
special challenges for the electoral process.
Pre-Electoral Context
Based on 1990 statistics, Oaxaca's population of 3,072,000 citizens
includes indigenous language speakers: 724,000 Zapotecos, 369,000
Mixtecos, 188,000 Mixes, and 108,000 Mazatecos, many of whom live in
small, isolated communities. The National Council on Population found
that 76 percent of Oaxaca's 570 municipalities contain high or
extremely high levels of poverty as measured by income, housing, and
education.
In Oaxaca, 418 municipalities have chosen not to use contests between
parties to elect local officials. Instead, as is allowed by Oaxaca
state law, they choose their leaders through usage and customs (usos y
costumbres), local practices rooted in indigenous systems of community
service which give particular importance to the judgment of elders,
open assemblies, and consensus. For access to government resources,
however, these communities remain dependent on the PRI-controlled
political system. In many cases this has enabled local political
leaders to gain power and subvert community autonomy through the
manipulation of usos y costumbres.
The PRD has won local elections in key areas such as Juchitán, as
the PAN has in Oaxaca City, but the PRI still dominates state politics
and military affairs. The PRI recently won the governorship with 47
percent of the vote and control of 114 of the 152 municipalities that
practice party politics instead of usos y costumbres. In addition to
PRI control of the police and state judicial hierarchy, in 1996 the
PRI began to intervene in municipal politics with a strong military
presence, particularly in the aftermath of actions by the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR). In Xanica, for instance, the community has
feared the return of the military who occupied their community for six
weeks; in Loxicha long-term military presence produced an atmosphere
of intimidation that clouded the electoral process.
Role of IFE and Electoral Reforms
In Oaxaca, institutional reforms and civic projects considerably aided
advances toward the democratization of the federal elections. Many
civic organizations demonstrated concerted efforts to inform the rural
population of their electoral rights, including: the IFE, Alianza
Cívica, progressive members of the Catholic Church, activists of
the PRD-dominated Alianza por México, and community projects
supported by the Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia (MCD) and the
National Indigenous Institute (INI). Efforts included training
citizens to be electoral observers, distributing pamphlets and posters
illustrating the voting process, advising citizens of their right to a
free and secret ballot, and warning against vote buying.
The local IFE council stated that it successfully recruited and
trained 27,426 randomly-selected volunteers to staff 99.9 percent of
the 3,922 voting stations in the state, despite difficulties in the
recruitment and training process. The IFE lost access to mass media
for recruitment at a vital point. Also, it lost potential recruits to
migration, lack of citizen status, or and personal, religious or
gender-related reasons. Attrition of recruits for IFE volunteers
raised concerns that pressured potential volunteers to drop out.
Oaxaca's countryside presented a number of challenges to the IFE's
efforts such as potential irregularities due to usos y costumbres
customs. About half of the municipalities governed by usos y
costumbres held general assemblies to deliberate whether to allow
voting stations in their communities. While all but two municipalities
choose to do so, it is likely that many continued to use traditional,
communal practices such as public assemblies and non-secret voting.
Another difficulty the IFE encountered was illiteracy and the low
level of education endemic in rural areas. The IFE had difficulty
training volunteers and accrediting local electoral observers. In the
regions of Pinotepa Nacional, San Juan Colorado, Xanica, and Río
Grande, IFE representatives were sometimes unclear about important
procedures. The community radio station XEJAM broadcast informational
messages about the elections in Mixtec, but aside from this effort,
little election information reached rural communities in indigenous
languages. The IFE itself could not find bilingual trainers to
instruct indigenous IFE volunteers, to produce training materials, or
to provide media outreach.
Intimidation and Militarization
Impunity contributes to the climate of militarization and intimidation
in Oaxaca. PRI candidates and authorities are often in a position to
threaten or commit acts of violence and intimidation without fear of
criminal proceedings. Authorities who commit such acts have the option
to appeal to the PRI governor who controls the state police and
judiciary.
One such case of intimidation occurred when the municipal agent
Soriano Díaz reproached Lucia Valencia for organizing a workshop on
voting rights, claiming that such activities divided the community and
created a climate of violence. Mr. Díaz warned Ms. Valencia that if
she held another workshop, he would take the matter to the Municipal
President of San Pedro Tututepec or to the governor of Oaxaca.
Another case of intimidation with impunity occurred when authorities
incarcerated a Mixe individual two weeks before the elections. He had
previously spoken out at a public meeting against the PRI
congressional candidate, Cándido Coheto Martínez. The
authorities subsequently deprived the prisoner of all contact with his
family. The individual later died in his prison cell, apparently a
victim of police brutality.
In Loxicha, the ongoing imprisonment of over 80 men is another example
of intimidation. The electoral observers met with women who are part
of a group that has held demonstrations in front of the government
offices in Oaxaca City over the past three years to protest human
rights violations in their communities. Many of the demonstrators'
charges are directed toward the current Municipal President and former
officer of the Judicial Police, Lucio Vásquez Ramírez. According
to testimony, in 1996 an alleged fatal guerilla attack on a police
station in the resort town of Huatulco set off a wave of repression
against the indigenous communities. Actions against the communities
included the arbitrary arrest of municipal authorities and bilingual
teachers, and other arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, and murders. The
military presence has increased under the pretext of combating alleged
drug trafficking and community involvement with the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR).
The electoral observers themselves experienced the effects of the
militarization during their visit to Oaxaca. To reach the municipal
capital, Loxicha, they passed through a military checkpoint known as a
Base de Operación Mixta where state and federal Judicial Police
work in conjunction with the army. Upon the arrival of the observers,
approximately 20 police, some out of uniform, detained the observers,
checked identification, and recorded names. Authorities forced the
observers to repeat the process twice before reaching Loxicha. The
police also accompanied observers to and from polling sites.
Vote Buying, Coercion, and the Misuse of State Resources
In Oaxaca, elections observers collected reports of vote buying and
coercion committed primarily by the PRI, but in two cases by the PAN
and PRD. Such practices are widespread, often accepted as the norm,
and may have potentially affected electoral outcome in rural areas.
In Chila, Río Grande, and Chacagua, beneficiaries of Progresa and
Procampo reported that local promoters of these programs and the
municipal president of San Pedro Tututepec himself, Ramiro Herrera,
threatened to end benefits to those that do not vote for the PRI.
Four days before the elections, a representative of the governor
attended a gathering in the community of Zoogocho with officials from
14 communities. The representative threatened that if the community
members did not vote for the PRI, "many doors would close," implying
that their benefits would be discontinued.
In Río Grande, Chacagua, La Luz, and San Pedro Tututepec, observers
received many reports of the PRI distributing basic goods (dispensas),
including chickens, cement, hoes, shovels, paint brushes, pails,
roofing materials, credit, cash, and promising housing, electricity, a
hospital, pavement of streets, bread shops, and corn grinding mills,
as a means of winning votes or garnering attendance at PRI rallies.
In Río Grande, Puerto Escondido, Chila, El Mamey, and Colotepec
observers received reports that PRI government officials warehoused
disaster relief material for victims of Hurricane Paulina in 1998 and
the earthquake of September 1999 and then distributed the materials in
the weeks prior to the elections.
Residents of Jolotepec, Tututepec, and El Mamey reported that
officials were distributing materials in a partisan fashion. On June
30, two days before the elections, observers found authorities
distributing cement from a local storage house located on the Pinotepa
Nacional-Puerto Escondido Highway. The officials gave about 55 people
from El Ciruelo and Jicaltepec six bags of cement each. Women at the
site testified that the PRI distributed the cement, and that the
Municipal President, Alvaro Baños, had told the recipients they
were all to vote for the PRI.
In many cases, vote buying involved improper use of voter
credentials. In Río Grande the Confederación Nacional Campesina
(CNC), a PRI-affiliated campesino organization, distributed 2,000
chickens a week prior to the elections. The organization charged
recipients a nominal fee for the chickens and asked them to show their
voter credential and to sign their names, urging them to vote for the
PRI.
The frequency of vote buying in rural areas is exacerbated by a
widespread acceptance of the practice. Although many citizens reported
vote buying to the IFE, no one had filed a formal charge until two
days before the elections. In Yojovi, a team from Alianza Cívica
and the PRD helped local officials file formal charges accusing the
PRI candidate for Congress, Cándido Coheto Martínez, of
large-scale vote buying and coercion. Coheto delivered 88 machetes to
citizens, forcing them to sign a form. He also illegally demanded
copies of voter credentials from individuals who were to receive
fertilizer and chickens from the head of the Women's Committee. The
local officials sent Coheto copies of the credentials, although the
individuals received neither the fertilizer nor the chickens.
According to IFE and Alianza Cívica, it is difficult to determine
the impact of vote buying and coercion on the outcome of particular
elections. Testimony indicated that many individuals had heard and
understood the IFE message that the vote was intended to be 'free and
secret.' However, Alianza Cívica, the Catholic Church, and NGOs in
Oaxaca believe many rural citizens feel obligated to vote for PRI, the
party distributing goods and services, because citizens have 'given
their word' or because they do not understand the way their vote will
be ascertained.
Election Day Observations
Overall, electoral violations were minor and occurred as a result of
the newness of the voting process, the inability of some voters to
read the ballot, and the physical conditions of the voting
station. However, significant irregularities did occur.
In Santa Rosa de Lima, observers saw an IFE volunteer peering into the
voting booth as individuals voted and then acknowledging those who
voted for the PRI. One observer learned from the IFE representative
that this volunteer had dismissed two original volunteers and
pressured the IFE to hire him in their stead.
In La Luz, a PRI party official distributed dispensas to citizens
immediately after they voted.
Significant electoral violations occurred in the militarized
municipality of Loxicha. IFE volunteers were not chosen at random and
were poorly trained because, according to the IFE representative,
those they initially chose declined to participate out of
fear. Heavily armed police officers were illegally present at voting
stations. Unauthorized PRI representatives also intimidated voters at
several voting stations.
At a voting station in PRI-dominated Tovala Copalita, observers
witnessed a wide variety of irregularities. Overall, the voting
station was extremely disorganized, making it impossible to ensure
that the procedures were being followed properly. The voting station
was located on the small porch of a local government office where
those who identified themselves as authorities conducted business and
watched the voting from just a few meters away. PRI propaganda was
visible to voters in the basketball court where they waited in line
and in the building itself. The majority of voters arrived by truck,
and one of the drivers confirmed that the municipal government paid
for the service in violation of electoral law. An IFE volunteer in the
position of "second examiner" assumed most of the duties of
"president," and the PAN representative marked the credentials,
although upon inspection, it was discovered that he had consistently
marked them incorrectly. The IFE volunteers rarely used the indelible
ink even after the IFE representative instructed them to do so. At
least one man voted twice, and IFE volunteers allowed at least three
individuals to vote even though they did not appear on the official
list.
Illiteracy and lack of education affected election day activities as
well as pre-electoral conditions. Observers noted that many voters,
mostly from indigenous communities, had little individual voting
experience and needed guidance in the ballot marking process. At rural
sites, typically 5 to 10 percent of the ballots were annulled because
they were marked incorrectly.
Conclusion
In Oaxaca, the IFE achieved marked success in guaranteeing relatively
free and secret elections for urban citizens and made important
strides in many rural areas. One sign of this achievement was the mood
on the morning of July 3 at the regional collection site for ballot
boxes in Miahuatlán. As IFE officials and volunteers brought in
their specially marked cases, they expressed pride in having taken
part in a process with unprecedented high levels of openness,
neutrality, and transparency.
Nevertheless, the pre-electoral conditions of these elections indicate
that the political rights of citizens and the legitimacy of election
results in rural areas in Oaxaca were threatened in serious
ways. Concerns for future elections in Oaxaca should include:
Whether or not the electoral processes will be developed for
communities that practice usos y costumbres so that they may take part
in state and federal elections without compromising their right to
continue local governance with respect for indigenous
traditions. Whether or not areas such as Loxicha will be free of
militarization, misuse of police power, and intimidation. Whether or
not state elections will be considered illegitimate should illegally
bought or coerced votes influence results, as they may have in these
elections considering the margin by which the PRI presidential and
congressional candidates won in Oaxaca. Whether or not federal
investigators and electoral tribunals will adapt procedures to assure
that one may challenge illegitimate electoral results in a timely and
effective way in order to guarantee the political right to
representation.
